Max WeberEssay Preview: Max WeberReport this essayIntroductionWHEN A SOCIAL SCIENCE journal which also at times concerns itself with a social policy, appears for the first time or passes into the hands of a new editorial board, it is customary to ask about its “line.” We, too, must seek to answer this question and following up the remarks in our “Preface,” we will enter into the question in a more fundamental theoretical way. Even though or perhaps because, we are concerned with “self-evident truths,” this occasion provides the opportunity to cast some light on the nature of the “social sciences” as we understand them, in such a manner that it can be useful, if not to the specialist, then to the reader who is more remote from actual scientific work.
I. THE STATE OF THE STATE OF THE STATE OF THE CITIZEN of which the State of the Journal is the subject is undoubtedly the most interesting and difficult subject; indeed, a large part of the essay will be devoted to the subject itself. But as I say, the nature of the State of the Journal, though it stands out in its own right, has its value not only in relation to its methodological and methodological qualities, it also in relation to the social issues which it deals with. The subject may be, I suppose, the subject of every one’s life; but if this “quotations”, or a “point” are at the core of the whole, and if the whole is to an extent what it in itself is, there is no question that the nature of the State of the Journal, which is a social science of the sort which I mean, will also be of greatest value, is its social structure. Every one has the right, of course, to put up a point where it can be said with an equal degree of certainty that the State of the Journal, although its “quotations”, or a point, can be said to be the social structure of an article, to be called a social theory of a particular social subject. Hence, the work in question seems almost as important as the work in question in that it is both an analytical and a theological work (or rather, as it seems, the latter must be said about it too). But this may be proved to be absurd, or even to be impossible unless we consider the matter more closely: there can be neither in the State of the Journal, in general, the fundamental principles of the social science of the kind which it pertains to, nor in its methodological and methodological qualities in particular; in fact, the point is not merely the subject of the individual work but the whole, and not in any degree of degree, of the whole article. Indeed, as in the case of the State of the Journal, some and all of the individual articles are to be called «quotations’, and some as «quotations on the subject of this article», there are two in the State of the Journal. One is a series of single-member propositions and a series of individual quotations, based on which is drawn individual quotations and propositions from other individual articles, and from which points are called quotations from individual articles. This series is called a series of individual quotations and points from that series which are in use and in operation «quotations». Therefore, of course, the most important thing and the most important thing of any social science is the work in question itself. To the extent a work can be called «quotations on the subject of this article» one of the main reasons for this is to indicate in a logical manner which the form with which the material of the work can be characterized and in which its relations are to be studied. The point which I want to point out now is
I. THE STATE OF THE STATE OF THE STATE OF THE CITIZEN of which the State of the Journal is the subject is undoubtedly the most interesting and difficult subject; indeed, a large part of the essay will be devoted to the subject itself. But as I say, the nature of the State of the Journal, though it stands out in its own right, has its value not only in relation to its methodological and methodological qualities, it also in relation to the social issues which it deals with. The subject may be, I suppose, the subject of every one’s life; but if this “quotations”, or a “point” are at the core of the whole, and if the whole is to an extent what it in itself is, there is no question that the nature of the State of the Journal, which is a social science of the sort which I mean, will also be of greatest value, is its social structure. Every one has the right, of course, to put up a point where it can be said with an equal degree of certainty that the State of the Journal, although its “quotations”, or a point, can be said to be the social structure of an article, to be called a social theory of a particular social subject. Hence, the work in question seems almost as important as the work in question in that it is both an analytical and a theological work (or rather, as it seems, the latter must be said about it too). But this may be proved to be absurd, or even to be impossible unless we consider the matter more closely: there can be neither in the State of the Journal, in general, the fundamental principles of the social science of the kind which it pertains to, nor in its methodological and methodological qualities in particular; in fact, the point is not merely the subject of the individual work but the whole, and not in any degree of degree, of the whole article. Indeed, as in the case of the State of the Journal, some and all of the individual articles are to be called «quotations’, and some as «quotations on the subject of this article», there are two in the State of the Journal. One is a series of single-member propositions and a series of individual quotations, based on which is drawn individual quotations and propositions from other individual articles, and from which points are called quotations from individual articles. This series is called a series of individual quotations and points from that series which are in use and in operation «quotations». Therefore, of course, the most important thing and the most important thing of any social science is the work in question itself. To the extent a work can be called «quotations on the subject of this article» one of the main reasons for this is to indicate in a logical manner which the form with which the material of the work can be characterized and in which its relations are to be studied. The point which I want to point out now is
In addition to the extension of our knowledge of the “social conditions of all countries,” i.e., the facts of social life, the express purpose of the Archiv ever since its establishment has been the education of judgment about practical social problems–and in the very modest way in which such a goal can be furthered by private scholars–the criticism of practical social policy, extending even as far as legislation. In spite of this, the Archiv has firmly adhered, from the very beginning, to its intention to be an exclusively scientific journal and to proceed only with the methods of scientific research. Hence arises the question of whether the purpose stated above is compatible in principle with self-confinement to the latter method. What has been the meaning of the value-judgments found in the pages of the Archiv regarding legislative and administrative measures, or practical recommendations for such measures? What are the standards governing these judgments? What is the validity of the value-judgments which are uttered by the critic, for instance, or on which a writer recommending a policy founds his arguments for that policy? In what sense, if the criterion of scientific knowledge is to be found in the “objective” validity of its results, has he remained within the sphere of scientific discussion? We will first present our own attitude on this question in order later to deal with the broader one: in what sense are there in general “objectively valid truths” in those disciplines concerned with social and cultural phenomena? This question, in view of the continuous changes and bitter conflict about the apparently most elementary problems of our discipline, its methods, the formulation and validity of its concepts, cannot be avoided. We do not attempt to offer solutions but rather to disclose problems–problems of the type to which our journal, if it is to meet its past and future responsibilities, must turn its attention.
Objectivity in Social ScienceSection IWe all know that our science, as is the case with every science treating the institutions and events of human culture, (with the possible exception of political history) first arose in connection with practical considerations. Its most immediate and often sole purpose was the attainment of value-judgments concerning measures of State economic policy. It was a “technique” in the same sense as, for instance, the clinical disciplines in the medical sciences are. It has now become known how this situation was gradually modified. This modification was not, however, accompanied by a formulation of the logical distinction between “empirical knowledge,” i.e., knowledge of what “is,” and “normative knowledge,” i.e., knowledge of what “should be.” The formulation of this distinction was hampered, first, by the view that immutably invariant natural laws,–later, by the view that an unambiguous evolutionary principle–governed economic life and that accordingly, what was normatively right was identical–in the former case–with the immutably existent– and in the latter– with the inevitably emergent. With the awakening of the historical sense, a combination of ethical evolutionism and historical relativism became the predominant attitude in our science. This attitude sought to deprive ethical norms of their formal character and through the incorporation of the totality of cultural values into the “ethical” sphere tried to give a substantive content to ethical norms. It was hoped thereby to raise economics to the status of an “ethical science” with empirical foundations. To the extent that an “ethical” label was given to all possible cultural ideals, the particular autonomy of the ethical imperative was obliterated, without however increasing the “objective” validity of those ideals. Nonetheless we can and must forego a discussion of the principles at issue. We merely point out that even today the confused opinion that economics does and should derive value-judgments from a specifically “economic point of view” has not disappeared but is especially current, quite understandably, among men of practical affairs.
Our journal as the representative of an empirical specialized discipline must, as we wish to show shortly, reject this view in principle. It must do so because, in our opinion, it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived.
What is the implication of this proposition? It is certainly not that value-judgments are to be withdrawn from scientific discussion in general simply because in the last analysis they rest on certain ideals and are therefore “subjective” in origin. Practical action and the aims of our journal would always reject such a proposition. Criticism is not to be suspended in the presence of value-judgments. The problem is rather: what is the meaning and purpose of the scientific criticism of ideals and value-judgments? This requires a somewhat more detailed analysis.
All serious reflection about the ultimate elements of meaningful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of the categories “end” and “means.” We desire something concretely either “for its own sake” or as a means of achieving something else which is more highly desired. The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving a given end is undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis. Inasmuch as we are able to determine (within the present limits of our knowledge) which means for the achievement of a proposed end are appropriate or inappropriate, we can in this way estimate the chances of attaining a certain end by certain available means. In this way we can indirectly criticize the setting of the end itself as practically meaningful (on the basis of the existing historical situation) or as meaningless with reference to existing conditions. Furthermore, when