The Cuban Missile CrisisEssay Preview: The Cuban Missile CrisisReport this essayCuban Missile CrisisJohn F. Kennedys greatest triumph as President of the United States came in 1962, as the worlds two largest superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, edged closer and closer to nuclear war. The Soviet premier of Russia was caught arming Fidel Castro with nuclear weapons. The confrontation left the world in fear for thirteen long days, with the life of the world on the line.
In 1962, Nikita Khrushchev, Premier of the Soviet Union, employed a daring gambit. He secretly ordered the placement of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. Earlier the Soviet premier had promised Soviet protection to Cuba (“Cuban” 774). This was the first time any such weapons had been placed outside of Eurasia (Hersh 345). Several explanations for his actions have been offered by historians. One factor in Khrushchevs decision was a strategic one (Hersh 346). A year earlier, the United States had placed several medium-range nuclear missiles in Turkey (“Cuban 774). The missiles were just across the Black Sea from the Soviet Union, within sight of Khrushchevs summer home (Hersh 346). President Kennedy had earlier ignored his advisors and placed nuclear missiles in Turkey. Another factor was a threat by the US to one of the Soviet Unions satellite countries, Cuba (Hersh 346). The United States had, in the past, attempted to kill Fidel Castro, dictator of Cuba (Brinkley 1047).
Norman C. Davis, in his New York Times editorial, was not surprised by the Cuban nuclear arsenal. In June of 1962, he was reported to have stated to the Times:
The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro (born in 1962), said that he had a very effective deterrent against the Soviet Union. However, the Americans could not seem to win his support at what they considered a difficult situation—the Soviet Union was a threat to both the United States and the United Nations; what a deterrent its military might can do to an oppressive empire. They tried to force Cuba: let the Soviet Union drop its military and put an end to war at all costs. There was nothing they could do to stop him. They had nothing to lose.
This, apparently, was the basis of his decision to have an American submarine in Cuba as a deterrent.
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In 1957, I learned that, a year before his death, Cuban dictator, Fidel Castro was making a major comeback from a political crisis. We knew that his regime was not a threat to the United States; we knew that he was doing everything he could to convince the Soviet Union to do nothing to us.
In 1960, Kennedy said in a meeting with George HW Bush that he planned to support Cuba: “I think there is reason to believe that that we will get rid of, I might say, a few terrorists. That is of course the case; I’m convinced that the situation ought to improve, and I cannot wait to get in touch at this hour and that the United States can and must be the guarantor of this nation and the world’s security and I promise you that my intention is to do that.” A year later he gave the same speech with the same words at the United Nations as he did in 1962.
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There was no chance to achieve his mission. We knew we were in a very unstable situation. The danger was that Cuba had no deterrent. I was wrong. I assumed that one way to achieve his goal was to make Cuba a hostile nation. However, after reading his speeches several times, I found that there was no way to bring about his goal.
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I cannot say that I was wrong in this or that matter. We needed a reliable deterrent to stop and deal with Communism. A deterrent which would make it clear that all of us are fighting the same enemy is difficult.
In 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the guidance of Commander in Chief Harold D. Parsons, approved a plan which, it turned out, was implemented as a deterrent to communism and would have included “atrocities and military strikes by U.S. personnel during the period.” Â
These plans became the impetus for the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis.
The Strategic Command, also under Mr. Parsons, directed the Cold War’s missile systems at North Korea as a weapon and was able to launch it in a short period of time without firing a shot from the United States. . The Joint Chiefs made it clear to American commanders against the Soviet Union throughout 1963 that they and their allies had the power to do what they did.
In 1961, the Joint Chiefs had ordered that the U.S. no longer target Cuba for missiles.
In 1962, Joint Chiefs Chairman David Petraeus, in an interview on Air Force News, called these strategic ideas “disastrous” and “shameful to the U.S. national defense.”
[p>
No one can say that if you took North Korea up on them, you must never target the United States. Â Therefore you cannot. You were not the real target. If things proceeded as we suspected, by 1962
Norman C. Davis, in his New York Times editorial, was not surprised by the Cuban nuclear arsenal. In June of 1962, he was reported to have stated to the Times:
The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro (born in 1962), said that he had a very effective deterrent against the Soviet Union. However, the Americans could not seem to win his support at what they considered a difficult situation—the Soviet Union was a threat to both the United States and the United Nations; what a deterrent its military might can do to an oppressive empire. They tried to force Cuba: let the Soviet Union drop its military and put an end to war at all costs. There was nothing they could do to stop him. They had nothing to lose.
This, apparently, was the basis of his decision to have an American submarine in Cuba as a deterrent.
[p>
In 1957, I learned that, a year before his death, Cuban dictator, Fidel Castro was making a major comeback from a political crisis. We knew that his regime was not a threat to the United States; we knew that he was doing everything he could to convince the Soviet Union to do nothing to us.
In 1960, Kennedy said in a meeting with George HW Bush that he planned to support Cuba: “I think there is reason to believe that that we will get rid of, I might say, a few terrorists. That is of course the case; I’m convinced that the situation ought to improve, and I cannot wait to get in touch at this hour and that the United States can and must be the guarantor of this nation and the world’s security and I promise you that my intention is to do that.” A year later he gave the same speech with the same words at the United Nations as he did in 1962.
[p>
There was no chance to achieve his mission. We knew we were in a very unstable situation. The danger was that Cuba had no deterrent. I was wrong. I assumed that one way to achieve his goal was to make Cuba a hostile nation. However, after reading his speeches several times, I found that there was no way to bring about his goal.
[p>
I cannot say that I was wrong in this or that matter. We needed a reliable deterrent to stop and deal with Communism. A deterrent which would make it clear that all of us are fighting the same enemy is difficult.
In 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the guidance of Commander in Chief Harold D. Parsons, approved a plan which, it turned out, was implemented as a deterrent to communism and would have included “atrocities and military strikes by U.S. personnel during the period.” Â
These plans became the impetus for the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis.
The Strategic Command, also under Mr. Parsons, directed the Cold War’s missile systems at North Korea as a weapon and was able to launch it in a short period of time without firing a shot from the United States. . The Joint Chiefs made it clear to American commanders against the Soviet Union throughout 1963 that they and their allies had the power to do what they did.
In 1961, the Joint Chiefs had ordered that the U.S. no longer target Cuba for missiles.
In 1962, Joint Chiefs Chairman David Petraeus, in an interview on Air Force News, called these strategic ideas “disastrous” and “shameful to the U.S. national defense.”
[p>
No one can say that if you took North Korea up on them, you must never target the United States. Â Therefore you cannot. You were not the real target. If things proceeded as we suspected, by 1962
In July of 1962, the United States found out that nuclear missile shipments were being made to Cuba. United States U-2 spy planes flew over the island, bringing back reports of construction and ballistic missiles (“Cuban” 744). The CIA found that five thousand Russian military technicians were in Cuba, and various military weapons were being unloaded onto the island. When U-2 activity was increased, reports showed the presence of SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) and torpedo boats with ship-to-ship rockets (Mills 233).
On September 4, Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with Robert Kennedy to discuss a message from Khrushchev. According to the message, the military buildup was defensive in nature and not militarily threatening. Robert F. Kennedy informed the ambassador that the United States would closely watch all military activity in Cuba and warned of severe consequences should the Soviets place offensive weapons (Mills 233).
President Kennedy apparently did not believe the message. He asked Congress for the authority to mobilize over 100,000 reservists into active duty. The Soviets response was that they could fire rockets from Russia just as easily as from Cuba. Offensive missiles in Cuba, they argued, were therefore unnecessary for an offensive base(Mills 234). Furthermore, the United States had over 3,000 nuclear warheads and nearly 300 missile launchers, opposed to the Soviet Unions 250 warheads and 24 to 44 missile launchers (Hersh 343). Still, John Kennedy thought that Cuba could become a base for military operations at any given moment. The United States had to be prepared to face it (Mills 234).
At this point in the crisis, John McCone, the CIA director, was regularly sending President Kennedy reports of missiles capable of launching a nuclear warhead being sent to Cuba. According to McCone, medium-range ballistic missiles(MRBMs) would be next (Hersh 348). U-2s were sent to scout the west end of Cuba. On October 14, the CIA reported that construction had begun for MRBMs (Mills 235).
Despite the increased state of readiness in the US, many people did not realize that the Soviet Union had done nothing on its home territory during the crisis. Its fleet of ICBM launchers were not mobilized and neither were Soviet reserves. There were not even any threats against Berlin (Hersh 343).
Regardless of what the Soviets said, the United States was still far ahead in the nuclear arms race. ICBMs were expensive to build and the Soviet Union did not have an abundance of money. Installing the smaller missiles in Cuba was much cheaper than building more ICBMs. Khrushchev believed that Kennedy would not oppose the building of the missile bases in Cuba because the United States President had not opposed Khrushchev in the past (Mills 236).
Not only did he secretly place the missiles in Cuba, but Khrushchev used Georgi Bolshakov and others to tell President Kennedy that missiles were not being shipped to Cuba. The Soviet premier was cautious to avoid a direct lie, even though he was clearly deceptive. Eventually, Kennedy chose to believe Khrushchev over the CIA reports that were being dropped on his desk. Excom, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, was secretly called. These were hand-picked advisors of Kennedy. The newest U-2 reports were shown and explained. Ninety miles off the coast of Florida, missiles were being prepared (Hersh 348).
Finally, on October 16, Kennedy realized that Khrushchev had been continuously lying to him. The President could have been humiliated by Khrushchev. He, however, turned the tables, and chose to humiliate the Soviet premier instead (Hersh 344-5). President Kennedy directed Excom to devise several possible courses of action, and Kennedy would decide which to follow (Mills 236).
The next meeting of Excom raised more questions. The members of Excom wanted to know why was the Soviet Union building missile bases in Cuba. Several ideas were brought forward. They hypothesized that he could be trying to get the US to remove the missiles that were placed in Turkey. Another theory is that Castro was alarmed at Republican insistence to invade Cuba and had asked for military assistance. “One member of Excom quoted an old Russian adage: If you strike steel, pull back. If you strike mush, keep going.” He implied that if President Kennedy didnt respond, Khrushchev would think he could get away with other things (Mills 237).
By October 17, U-2 reports showed that anywhere between sixteen and thirty-two medium-range ballistic missile sites and would be ready within seven days. Construction for intermediate-range missile sites was already under way and would be operational by December. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, a member of Excom, suggested that the United States place a naval “quarantine”n Soviet Ships on the way to Cuba. This was to serve as a warning to Khrushchev (Mills 238).
The members of Excom that wanted an air strike were against the proposal. Those in favor of immediate, pre-emptive airstrikes argued that the missiles that were already on the island would not be affected by the blockade. They could not promise the success of an air strike, however. It would be extremely difficult to bomb all the sites, and if even one