The Troubled Democratisation of Russia and the Resilience of Authoritarianism in Iran and ChinaSynopsisThe Freedom House Report of 2009, along with other sources provide sufficient information to academically suggest that the third wave of democratization that has been washing over the globe since the 1970s has indeed been receding since the turn of the 21st century.
IntroductionThe states of Iran, China and Russia support the statement that democracy has lost its appeal at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, albeit to varying degrees. A retreat of democracy represents the retreat of countries with governing bodies which are elected from a group of political parties by the majority of the citizens to represent their social interest. The political parties must also have the same opportunities of winning, i.e. equal access to media and resources, for campaigning. Democratic systems also tend to be associated with the provision of various freedoms and rights including the freedom of speech and the press and the right to fair trial in the judicial system (Callaghan, 2000 p. 23).
At the other end of the governmental spectrum lie authoritarian systems. Unlike democracy, translated as ‘rule of the people’, a country holding an authoritarian political system is characterized by stern leadership and control by a small elite, with repression of any opposition. Rulers of these systems tend to abuse their powers and often ignore the cries of citizens who generally lack civil liberties (Callaghan, 2000 p. 36). This kind of leadership resides in states like Iran and China, where it seems to have taken deep root, having resisted democratization for so long. The resilience that has occurred may continue to occur not only for reasons associated with authoritarian regimes, but also for reasons unique to Iran and China themselves. Whilst in Russia, a state that claims itself to be democratic, it is evident that there is a struggle in the transition from
The authoritarianism of Venezuela
In the past, authoritarian regimes have been represented by the Venezuelan government—the regime that is known for its use of force and repression of dissent with impunity. However, following the ousting of Nicolás Maduro in December 2011, it has been clear for quite some time that the country would not be able to govern without the support of a regime that has provided the political apparatus through its economic policies.
It has been estimated that between 1.6 million and 1/5 million Venezuelans have no access to electricity, water or shelter. According to Venezuela’s Department of Agriculture, the government is able to cover 40 percent of the population by means of electricity alone, as well as many water and sanitation programs (Fouyar, 1998, p. 36; Chabot, 2002, pp. 484-489; G. D. Vlasic, et al., 2010). The same, in fact, is true for Venezuela, where the United Nations and the IMF report, “The National Economy (2017)” suggest that the only way for economic growth to continue is through increased access to electricity (R. Zarrabian, 2016) or through a series of other forms of self-managed social programs.
For Venezuelan socialism to continue under these conditions, the regime has to rely on economic growth and on the social benefits that arise from a strong population and a high level of social coordination. This is not only difficult, but entails the need for drastic steps towards a more social democratic society. The system currently constructed for Venezuela is a long and complicated one, based in part on the failure of democracy.
In order to further consolidate that failure and advance his project, and even to maintain the status quo for the last several decades, Nicolas Maduro introduced the current constitution that was adopted in 2010. It was designed to restore political stability but also to ensure that the Bolivarian nation never fails to support the government. Venezuela has been the third biggest economy under the newly imposed model, a position that has historically been highly volatile, yet has already gained confidence in 2014. According to the Venezuelan parliament’s ranking of countries ranking in the world, in 2012 Venezuela was ranked as the 28th biggest country. (Note: This is based on a ranking of the top 19 economic institutions of the world by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ranking on the basis of its quality of life). In other words, during the last ten years Venezuela has had the most stability under the new constitution.
Venezuela has experienced political instability of magnitude and degree—it has been in turmoil, and under the guidance of Nicolás Maduro (and especially through his administration of Nicolas Maduro)[2] it has also experienced and endured a significant influx of foreign investment throughout the country. Following the toppling of Nicolás Maduro and his close allies, the government has relied on the financial system of Venezuela for its financing. However, in reality, since the fall of the socialist regime, the country has been in a state of deep instability—there have been periods of deep-seated insecurity and distrust between local people, the security institutions under the rule of democratically elected President Nicolás Maduro and the state (Fouyar, 2009, p. 58, for instance). This distrust has been seen as more serious by members of Venezuela’s mainstream media, notably the Associated Press (“The Venezuelan People Speak a Common Language”) and the Venezuelan government. The regime has also used economic sanctions to pressure