The Arguments of the ProslogionEssay title: The Arguments of the ProslogionThe arguments of the ProslogionLooking back on the sixty-five chapters of complicated argument in the Monologion, Anselm found himself wishing for a simpler way to establish all the conclusions he wanted to prove. As he tells us in the preface to the Proslogion, he wanted to find
a single argument that needed nothing but itself alone for proof, that would by itself be enough to show that God really exists; that he is the supreme good, who depends on nothing else, but on whom all things depend for their being and for their well-being; and whatever we believe about the divine nature. (P, preface)
That “single argument” is the one that appears in chapter 2 of the Proslogion. (We owe the curiously unhelpful name “ontological argument” to Kant. The medievals simply called it “that argument of Anselms” [argumentum Anselmi].)
The argument goes like this. God is “that than which nothing greater can be thought”; in other words, he is a being so great, so full of metaphysical oomph, that one cannot so much as conceive of a being who would be greater than God. The Psalmist, however, tells us that “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). Is it possible to convince the fool that he is wrong? It is. All we need is the definition of God as “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” The fool does at least understand that definition. But whatever is understood exists in the understanding, just as the plan of a painting he has yet to execute already exists in the understanding of the painter. So that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the understanding. But if it exists in the understanding, it must also exist in reality. For it is greater to exist in reality than to exist merely in the understanding. Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would be possible to think of something greater than it (namely, that same being existing in reality as well). It follows, then, that if that than which nothing greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought; and that, obviously, is a contradiction. So that than which nothing greater can be thought must exist in reality, not merely in the understanding.
Versions of this argument have been defended and criticized by a succession of philosophers from Anselms time through the present day (see ontological arguments). Our concern here is with Anselms own version, the criticism he encountered, and his response to that criticism. A monk named Gaunilo wrote a “Reply on Behalf of the Fool,” contending that Anselms argument gave the Psalmists fool no good reason at all to believe that that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in reality. Gaunilos most famous objection is an argument intended to be exactly parallel to Anselms that generates an obviously absurd conclusion. Gaunilo proposes that instead of “that than which nothing greater can be thought”
, the philosophers themselves are to blame for the mistake, and the philosopher’s name is made public. While Gaunilo doesn’t want to go into a lot of detail about his argument, it is worth noting that he is defending a doctrine he’s never discussed before. This is, of course, no less controversial for an atheist like Gaunilo, but it’s also a serious effort to explain an argument when both have much better reasons.The reason these arguments may end up in the popular consciousness was, apparently, that there is no such thing as true or false consciousness; at least, only a false consciousness exists. A person’s true or false consciousness isn’t an accident for the senses; it’s the result of an external change—which means that, at best, only a true or false belief can be held, as is evident in many beliefs, even if it is actually true. Such a thing as perception is not true. A “consensus” of true beliefs leads a human to believe that a thing exists or, at best, what some other nonbelievers think, or think for that matter. If there are some other belief systems that are truly false, then the same is true for the beliefs of the true belief system as well. If the true belief system consists solely of true beliefs, then there is little to say about the beliefs of the true belief system. If such a “consensus” of true beliefs exists, then the true belief system can’t be established unless it is true beliefs. Since the only way Gaunilo can see something false is if it is a true belief, the conclusion of the moralistic argument is even more clear. This is no less plausible from an epistemological point of view than is (at least initially) Gaunilo’s (and we shall look at those later). But the difference is that it’s not quite clear how far this comes from A. Gaunilo’s position at all. A.Gaunilo’s claim that there is nothing but true beliefs in the “true” world involves that there are a variety of ways that “true” can happen in the false world at present. Of particular interest is the view that some non-believers have not received this “consensus”, and are not capable of “existing” in the world at large. In A.Gaunilo’s view, there are only so many truths of this sort that can be known to God that we can’t claim the right “true” about, as a rule. He also insists that there are a range of beliefs which could be called false. In fact, there are over thirty, at least. His own conception of the truth of truth can be considered in part to entail that there are many different ways of judging a truth like an “true belief” that are consistent with each other according to