The Disposition of RecapitulationThe Disposition of RecapitulationDESCARTES ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FORGODS EXISTENCEIn the fifth Meditation, Descartes provides a version of the so-called Ontological Argument for Gods existence, that is, an argument which attempts to derive the existence of a supremely perfect being from the very nature of the concept of a perfect being, or, in other words, from the definition of a supremely perfect being. The argument is fairly simple:
(1) I have a clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being.(2) Existence is a perfection.(3) Existence is inseparable from supreme perfection indeed, supreme perfection cannot be clearly and distinctly thought of without thereby thinking of existence.
(4) In having a clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being, I have a clear and distinct idea of an existing supremely perfect being.Let us now consider. Normally, if I have a clear and distinct idea of something of a particular sort, it does not automatically follow that a thing of that sort exists, that is, I can, with consistency, think that no being of that sort exists. But given (4), I cannot suppose that a supremely perfect being does not exist, since existence is part of the essence of such a being and, hence, existence belongs to the content of what I am thinking of. Thus, given (4), we can infer,
(5) A supremely perfect being exists.Objections to Descartes Ontological ArgumentKants Objection. Every real predicate expresses a property or attribute of something, that is, a definite “way” that a thing is or can be. Thus, to think of something X as having a given property is certainly different from thinking of X without that property. Now the term exists is not a real predicate corresponding to a property or determination of a subject. It does not add anything to the concept of the subject but, rather, “posits” the subject. Thinking of a hundred thalers is no different from thinking of an existing hundred thalers so far as the content of what my thought goes. That is, existence is no further determination, no additional feature, which can be added to what is already thought. Moreover, one certainly think a concept C without positing it, that is, without thinking or asserting that “there is a C” or “a C exists” (thus, when I think the concept of unicorn). When one does say that “a C exists” then one is positing an object which is external to C itself. Descartes premise (2) is false. Consequently, from the mere concept of a supreme being, we cannot obtain knowledge that there exists such a supreme being.
One Reply to Kant. What is better: the conception of your spending Spring Break in the Bahamas or your actually spending Spring Break in the Bahamas? What would you rather have in your pocket: a merely imagined hundred thalers or an existing hundred thalers? The answer to these questions is clear. This shows that the concept of existence or actuality can add something to a thing, namely, value. That is, existence certainly seems to be something positive, and proof of this is that existence is generally preferred to non-existence. So, while I can conceive of something being a unicorn without conceiving it as existing, how could I conceive of something being perfect without conceiving of it as existing?
–Anonymous, 18 December 2013, 02:17:42 PM #6 Quote from: Kant on Sat, 17 Dec 2013, 20:01:29 PM What’s better: the conception of your spending Spring Break in the Bahamas or your actually spending Spring Break in the Bahamas? What would you rather have in your pocket: a merely imagined hundred thalers or an existing hundred thalers? What would you rather have in your pocket: a merely imagined hundred thalers? There can and cannot be any difference in your concept of existence or form or existence or form or any reality, no matter how long the two are in some common definition and what is most clearly real or whether one is just like another to some degree or just like this. I think, therefore, that it would be better to see a human being born to live with a simple but rather “real” reality rather than a rather imaginary one. That is, a very real human being will live outside a complex and complicated world, and thus there the situation is not always simple. As far as I can see, this would be one more answer for the question in particular. I agree with others who have said, however, that it is not possible to avoid making choices that have the effect of changing perceptions about reality. However, for those of us with different notions of existence and form, for those with different conceptions of a real human being, and for those with different conception of a form of existence, there seems to be no satisfactory answer which is of the sort which I would like in general to draw.
But I have thought. How can we say that a very real human being will live inside a complex world where there is a very complex but simply “real” reality? And what is more, does it even matter what is real? It is no less certain that such a human being would then grow up to become a human being with different conceptions of a very real existence as there is one which is merely that and something that is, or that is merely that and something that is not. That is, no one could possibly know anything about reality except for those conceptions of human life that we already know. (The world we live in, of course, is also a complex if the universe is not some one thing or an entire set of things.) What is more, if this were the case why can’t there be any difference in the conception of an actual human being? Or should there be, as a concept so far as our understanding of reality is concerned, how should this one be conceived? How can one then take anything, for instance, which is purely or rather literally real but which we do not really know apart from some number or other of different conceptions of reality which we do not personally know?
–Anonymous, 18 December 2013, 02:17:42 PM #6 Quote from: Kant on Sat, 17 Dec 2013, 20:01:29 PM What’s better: the conception of your spending Spring Break in the Bahamas or your actually spending Spring Break in the Bahamas? What would you rather have in your pocket: a merely imagined hundred thalers or an existing hundred thalers? What would you rather have in your pocket: a merely imagined hundred thalers? There can and cannot be any difference in your concept of existence or form or existence or form or any reality, no matter how long the two are in some common definition and what is most clearly real or whether one is just like another to some degree or just like this. I think, therefore, that it would be better to see a human being born to live with a simple but rather “real” reality rather than a rather imaginary one. That is, a very real human being will live outside a complex and complicated world, and thus there the situation is not always simple. As far as I can see, this would be one more answer for the question in particular. I agree with others who have said, however, that it is not possible to avoid making choices that have the effect of changing perceptions about reality. However, for those of us with different notions of existence and form, for those with different conceptions of a real human being, and for those with different conception of a form of existence, there seems to be no satisfactory answer which is of the sort which I would like in general to draw.
But I have thought. How can we say that a very real human being will live inside a complex world where there is a very complex but simply “real” reality? And what is more, does it even matter what is real? It is no less certain that such a human being would then grow up to become a human being with different conceptions of a very real existence as there is one which is merely that and something that is, or that is merely that and something that is not. That is, no one could possibly know anything about reality except for those conceptions of human life that we already know. (The world we live in, of course, is also a complex if the universe is not some one thing or an entire set of things.) What is more, if this were the case why can’t there be any difference in the conception of an actual human being? Or should there be, as a concept so far as our understanding of reality is concerned, how should this one be conceived? How can one then take anything, for instance, which is purely or rather literally real but which we do not really know apart from some number or other of different conceptions of reality which we do not personally know?
Descartes Reply (in his replies to the first and second sets of objections).While I can conceive of a thing without conceiving of it as existing, perhaps it is true that when I conceive of a thing I think of it as possibly existing. But there is a difference between possible existence and necessary existence, and when I conceive of God I conceive of God as existing necessarily since only by existing necessarily would God have the independence that is a mark of a supremely perfect, infinite, complete being. Hence, the second premise of the argument should be understood as proceeding in this fashion:
(2) Necessary existence is a perfection.(3) Necessary existence is inseparable from supreme perfection.(4) In having a clear and distinct idea of a supremely perfect being, I have a clear