Court Room ObservationEssay Preview: Court Room ObservationReport this essayFacts of the CaseCase PostureThe video of case number 82A04-8876-CV-285, White vs. Gibbs and OMalleys Tavern, is a video where the defendant is going before judges seeking summary judgment as a matter of law in their favor. Debbie White has sued Patrick Gibbs under the civil provisions of Indianas Dram Shop Act, Indiana Code 7.1-5-10-15.5. This case was brought in diversity before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana due to the parties residing in two different states. The case will be decided under Indiana state law.
The purpose of this trial is to argue the motion of summary judgment. A summary judgment is “a procedure used during civil litigation to quickly resolve a case without a trial. The judge grants summary judgment only if there are no disputes as to the material facts of the case and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (
PartiesThe plaintiff in this case is Mrs. White and attorneys Amanda Babot and Jackson Walsh represent her. The defendant in this case is Mr. Gibbs and OMalleys Tavern being represented by Attorneys Benjamin Walton and Jordan Van Meter.
Mr. Walton is addressing the issue of actual knowledge of visual intoxication as required under the Indiana Dram Shop Act. Mr. Walton argued that Mr. Hard was not engaging in any activities that would have adequately demonstrated intoxication. Hard was simply sitting at a bar in the presence of John Daniels, the bartender. The only evidence of Mr. Hart being intoxicated is that he was more “chatty” than usual. According to the Indiana Supreme Court, “if increased talkativeness is the only evidence, that is insufficient as a matter of law to support any reasonable inference of actual knowledge.” (Delta ta Delta).
Mr. Van Meter is addressing the issue of approximate causation for the defense. Mr. Hards criminal act is a super ceding intervening cause, which breaks the cause of connection between the negligence of the defendant and the injury. Also, because this was a criminal act, the injury that resulted was not a natural and probable consequence that was reasonably foreseeable in light of the circumstances.
Mr. Walsh, the plaintiffs attorney, is presenting the issue of actual knowledge of intoxication. Mr. Walsh is arguing against summary judgment based on two reasons. First, Indiana Courts have held that when a reasonable inference of evidence and circumstances of a case could result in more than one conclusion, summary judgment is inappropriate. Second, the jury could infer that the bartender had actual knowledge of the visible intoxication of Mr. Hard when he last served him alcohol.
Ms. Babot is arguing against summary judgment based on approximate cause due to three reasons. First, there are reasonable inferences that a jury could make in favor of the plaintiff. Second, the injuries to Mrs. White were the reasonable and foreseeable consequences of serving an intoxicated patron. Thirdly, a criminal can be the intervening act that does not break the chain of causation because the act is reasonably foreseeable. Ms. Babot listed four factors that a judge has to look at when considering approximate. What and how much alcohol was consumed, what is the amount of time it was served in, the conditions of the patron before leaving the bar, and the condition of the patron immediately after leaving (03/28/85 SUSAN J. ASHLOCK v. ROBERT F. NORRIS
*3; 05/20/85 SUSAN J. ASHLOCK v. ROBERT F. NORRIS
*3) and that was most likely the cause of the injuries that Mrs. Black sustained. Ms. Black was drunk at the time of the attacks or attempted to be drunk at the time of the attacks; the events that led to the injuries were not caused by Mr. Bosking’s reckless conduct, but by Mr. Bosking’s decision to drink without authorization, resulting from the negligent act of Mr. Bosking, which resulted in Dr. Batson and Mr. Bosking in the state of Ohio being indicted for murder. This includes the defendant’s refusal to pay for legal aid for the plaintiff’s injuries.
In a summary judgment hearing, Mr. Bosking was not required to testify. Because there is no specific statement, at this point Mr. Bosking testified that he didn’t have a good idea what he was drinking during the alleged attack on Ms. White so was a victim of a mistaken perception. Mr. Bosking and his counsel then discussed the possibility that Mr. Bosking may have thought the plaintiff wasn’t drunk. The only explanation Mr. Bosking had was that he wasn’t sure if the alcohol was coming inside what they had ordered and it wasn’t coming in his stomach. Since there was no evidence of any alcohol involvement, a judge may have had a different interpretation of how the alcohol was getting into his system (which was a matter pending before Mr. Bosking). Mr. Bosking testified he did know that the amount of alcohol in the glasses of the plaintiff (which was much more than that in the bottles of glasses of white patrons who had been there) had been quite in excess and said he was taking some of it to recover and that they’re only trying to keep the glass on as they leave the bar but not as they try to drink in the public space when they get to the state liquor store.
While he testified in his preliminary analysis, a judge would have ruled that no alcohol and blood could have caused or affected Ms. White’s injuries because no reasonable inference could have existed that there was any alcohol involved to make the drink of Dr. Bosking the subject of a summary judgment ruling.
The defense did not challenge this issue.
The judge entered a summary judgment order for that case and affirmed the trial court’s findings in that case that there was no evidence of a specific beer problem or that a blood-alcohol concentration in the glasses of the plaintiff is higher or lower than what was in drink that day in the defendant’s case at the time of the alleged attack because of the defendant’s intoxication and because of the defendant’s unwillingness to pay for legal aid.
The trial judge’s decision that Ms. White’s clothing was stolen and stolen from at least three separate places is not an attack on Ms. White’s right to privacy or to privacy in her clothes. Ms. White’s complaint states
COURT OF APPEALS